Loss of coastal homes - time we knew the big picture

Beyond definitional quagmires and patchy data

Coastal communities and authority – partnership or conflict?

There is plenty I remain unclear about when it comes to the implications of rising sea levels and related policy decisions for those English and Welsh coastal dwellers whose homes are expected to be lost over time.  

I know that government is not minded to compensate losers, but also that it has trialled payments to those facing imminent loss through recent Coastal Pathfinder projects[1]. I don’t know what this means for policy, however – Pathfinders were initiated under a different government with, arguably, a rather different take on how risks should be shared between society and the individual.

I do know that, to a significant extent, government considers the achievement of just outcomes in this context to be predicated on communities’ exertion of influence on decision-making. DEFRA-commissioned guidance states that “communities that are most at risk to coastal change (sic) must be informed, engaged, and empowered to take an active part in what happens locally.”[2] (p.7) However, I am concerned that statements such as “The risk management authorities should work in partnership with communities to understand the community perspective of flooding and coastal erosion…and encourage them to have direct involvement in decision-making and risk management actions” (2011, p.14) threaten to obscure difficulties worthy of attention. 

 Leaving aside for one moment issues over precisely what is meant by terms such as ‘community’, and what the solution of problems might look like, there is evidence – as yet not particularly well-developed - of conflict between authorities and coastal ‘losers’. A recent analysis of national adaptation strategies[3] in European countries, referring to the UK, states that “The debate about the extent to which sea defences should be strengthened or ‘managed realignment’ planned for has been very controversial in some places.” (p.266) This was subsequently echoed by The Parliamentary Office of Science and Technology (POST)[4], which highlighted “friction between government policy and local communities”, observing that “In places where the perceived threat to property and community vitality is high, community action groups have formed to seek policy change or compensation for loss.” (p.4) I wonder just how much conflict such encounters can accommodate and still be considered ‘partnerships, and remain curious as the scale and nature of such encounters and related conflict give that the bigger picture with regard to the loss of property over time remains unclear. 

Loss of homes - the big picture

I do know that government estimates that “In England, in 2009, around 5.2 million, or one in six, residential and commercial properties were identified as being in areas at risk of flooding from rivers, the sea and surface water. In addition, approximately 200 properties are assessed as being vulnerable at present, and 2,000 may become vulnerable, to coastal erosion over the next 20 years.”[5] (p.5) But I don’t know the scale of the problem as it applies the projected loss of coastal homes in England and Wales over time, and it is worth noting that the statement above only covers England, when Shoreline Management Plans (SMPs) set top level policy for sea defence in both England and Wales. Second, no distinction is made between risks from river flooding and risks from sea flooding. Third, what ‘vulnerable’ means in this context is not clear to me. However, on the grounds that it is distinguished from simply being ‘at risk of flooding’, I assume a suggestion of property likely to be lost to the sea. Finally, I’m not sure whether this applies to residential property only, or covers commercial/industrial and other buildings.

Finding consistent and comprehensive information on residential coastal properties likely to be lost to the sea under government preferred policies is difficult, if not impossible. A recent Internet trawl for data relevant contained in all second generation SMPs threw up various difficulties:

·         Far from all second generation SMPs had been published on-line by the relevant Operating Authorities when I searched them in November 2011, and of those that were published some were in draft form.

·         Where SMPs contained data on properties at risk under preferred policies, this was codified inconsistently. For example, some reported in terms of the financial value of properties concerned, whereas others report in terms of the number of properties. Others still were content to report simply that there are potential effects on property, without enumerating.  

·         A similar problem applies in terms of timeframes – whereas most SMPs that reported at all did so using short-, medium- and long-term analyses, one reported only over the whole 0-100 year period.

·         Finally, some SMPs were coy on the numbers of properties likely to be lost as investment in defence by affected communities remains to be negotiated.

I do know, however, that a detailed picture of homes likely to be lost is anticipated by officials imminently, and that it is expected to cover not only predicted erosion for the coasts of England and Wales but also the number of homes lost to the sea under government’s preferred policies in both the short term (0-20 years), medium term (20-50 years) and long term (50-100 years). A comprehensive understanding of homes expected to be lost under government policies, and the people and communities who inhabit them with a view to achieving just outcomes, is overdue.

It is imperative that government propels this information into the public domain and encourages its consideration. The public needs to know the numbers, and I want to know who is to shoulder these losses, where they are, and what kinds of settlements they live in. This, I suggest, may be closely related to their ability to negotiate acceptable outcomes with authority.

---

[1] http://www.defra.gov.uk/environment/flooding/coastal-change-pathfinders/

[2] DEFRA 2009c. Guidance for Community Adaptation Planning and Engagement (CAPE) on the Coast, working paper, Scott Wilson/Defra 2009.

[3] Swart, R., Biesbroek, R., Binnerup, S., Carter, T., Cowan, C., Henrichs, T.,

Loquen, S., Mela, H., Morecroft, M., Reese, M. and Rey, D. 2009. Europe Adapts to Climate Change: Comparing National Adaptation Strategies. PEER Report No 1. Helsinki: Partnership for European Environmental Research.

[4] Parliamentary Office of Science and Technology. 2010. Postnote Number 363.

[5] Department for Environment Food and Rural Affairs & the Environment Agency. 2011. Understanding the risks, empowering communities, building resilience: the national flood and coastal erosion risk management strategy for England. London: The Stationery Office.

What might social justice look like?

So what will this blog be about? Well, potentially many things within what is a broad interest.

In recent years government has gone in for a process known as Shoreline Management Planning, with the second generation of plans now more or less complete. Whereas it was once broadly the case that government would look to defend wherever needed defending (despite being under no legal obligation to do so), it has been observed that the new orthodoxy is to look for areas of coastline that might be allowed to ‘realign’ in natural fashion. The second round of Shoreline Management Plans, then, sets sea defence policy for the entire coast of England and Wales – both by area and over the short (0-20yrs), medium (20-50yrs) and long (50-100yrs) terms. One of four options is possible for each of area (or policy unit) over each of these epochs, although essentially these boil down to whether the area will continue to be defended or not. For example, where I live will see a policy of ‘Hold the Line’ pursued in the short and medium terms – meaning that the coast will be protected to the current standard for a minimum of 50 years – with a switch to a policy of ‘managed realignment’ some times after that. What will happen, or when, is unclear. However, we have been told we can expect to lose our homes – a fate that awaits many others. What happens to us ‘losers’ is also less than clear.  Until recently we could expect to be presented with a bill for the cost of demolishing our homes, although that policy was recently withdrawn. A report is also due on Coastal Pathfinder projects which explored ‘adaptation’ schemes, one of which saw payments made to those losing their homes in North Norfolk. Whether or not this will become an orthodoxy (and for whom), however, I have no idea.

Having been introduced in sharp fashion to the question of what happens to people whom government policy suggests can expect to lose their homes to the sea at some point in the future, and met many others who have been similarly perplexed at the prospect of this, I've developed an interest in what might be considered 'fair' in this context. For example, is it fair that the public purse should stand the burden of either defending or compensating the relatively few individuals whose homes rising sea levels are likely to claim? The utilitarian logic favoured by government says not, and many agree. Conversely, however, we might argue that we relatively few individuals are ultimately the victims of sea level rise caused by the polluting activities of the developed world -  a view for which support might be found in the relevant policy literature. In this case, does a utlitarian logic suffice, or do we need to look at models of social justice that foreground the needs of the vulnerable rather than the well-being of the majority? 

Of course this is only to scratch the surface of a hugely complex subject, and as I read and write more as part of the research I'm doing I'll be kicking these and other ideas around on this blog. My study ‘Informed, Engaged and Empowered? A thicker description of community participation in the setting of coastal climate change adaptation policy’ will look at how communities experience the business of trying to influence decisions around sea defence policy – a key part of how government sees just outcomes being achieved. This, of course, is very much in tune with ideas of ‘localism’ in terms of policy decision-making, which seek to involve citizens in decisions of direct importance to them and has appealed to recent administrations. Inspired by my own experience and valuable conversations with my peers in other threatened communities, my concern is that smaller, less well-off groups of people are inhibited in a variety of ways in terms of influencing policy decisions, and so are less likely to see outcomes that they like.

So, through this blog I’ll be looking at many of the ideas that are relevant to the subject as I try to make better sense of what socially just outcomes might look like. I’ll also write about the information I collect through my own research, and what I think it means. In part, this is a selfish act – I think the best way for me to work is to write regularly and to a deadline, and I’ll be looking to blog once a week. But I also hope that what I come up with may be useful – to others who risk being disadvantaged and who want to argue the toss, policy makers, the officials looking to work with communities under threat, and academics. And if anybody cares to join in the discussion all the better.

With best wishes

Chris