CLIMATE CHANGE, CONSUMPTION AND CONFLICT What inspires coastal ‘losers’ to protest, together, about their lot?

Where homes are to be lost to the sea as a consequence of climate change, sea level rise and related policy decisions, Defra has stated an intention to support affected communities in adapting to the physical, social and economic effects of change.[1] (p.19) 

Defra-commissioned guidance for local authorities specific to this purpose – ‘Guidance for Community Adaptation Planning and Engagement (CAPE) on the Coast’ - states that “communities that are most at risk to coastal change (sic) must be informed, engaged, and empowered to take an active part in what happens locally.”[2] (p.7)  CAPE has it that extensive engagement might be recommended where consultation is “characterised by (potential or actual) high conflict, controversy and uncertainty about the problem” although, again, this is “most likely to affect many.” (p.23) Here, the guidance appears to assume an awareness and capacity on the part of affected communities that might inform coherent and powerful protest – but on what basis, or bases, might we expect people in affected communities to act collectively with a view to influencing policy?

The social movement theorist Charles Tilly proposes that “The analysis of collective action has five big components: interest, organization, mobilization, opportunity, and collective action itself”, with ‘interest’ concerned with “the gains or losses resulting with a group’s interaction with other groups”[3] (p.7). Recent decades have seen reevaluation of ‘traditional’ structural interpretations of collective interest and action in the context of industrial societies. According to Della Porta and Diani, such interpretation made central conflicts between capital and labour. Key to this was the idea of a working class identity – and associated political behaviour – that was the consequence not only of its relationship to the means of economic production, but also to the concentration of workers in “large productive units” and in urban areas.[4] (2006; p.38) 

However, change has thrown the utility of this interpretation into question. Della Porta and Diani propose that a decline in industrial work in favour of administrative and service occupations and accompanying new middle class, a shift away from stable and protected forms of work, migration to the stronger economies and the entry of women into the labour force have all contributed to a muddying of the water in terms of class relations and conflicts, with the consequence that it has “affected lines of definition and criteria for interest definition within social groups, which were previously perceived as homogeneous.” (p.39)

The rise of consumption sectors

Potentially useful to us given the centrality of state decision-making to coastal change is Touraine’s proposal that the crucial cleavage now is “between the different kinds of [state] apparatus and user – consumers or more simply the public – defined less by their specific attributes than by their resistance to domination by the apparatus.”[5] (1981, p.6-7)

Taking up this theme, Taylor-Gooby describes the development of the state and its involvement in people’s lives as a “striking feature of the post-war political economy” and describes as important attempts to understand the relevance of these developments for political consciousness through “the idea of consumption sectors”[6] (p.592). This refers to “the division between groups in society who share common interests based on division in access to the means of consumption” (p.592). Saunders observes that “One obvious candidate for such a new fault line is housing tenure, for the decline of class voting seems to coincide with the growth of working-class home ownership”[7] (p.206) – again, this seems apposite given what is at stake for home owners who stand to ‘lose’ from coastal change.

In terms of the formation of political alignment and activity, Dunleavy writes that “Collective consumption…is typically concerned with services provided by the state apparatus…In exclusively individualized forms for consumption, location continues to be determined by household incomes…”. Collective consumption processes, he tells us, “create an inter-subjective-basis for the development of political action”, in part due to “the directly politicized context of provision”.[8] (p.418-9) I take this to mean that conflict is sparked by competing demands on collective provision which may not all be satisfied as a consequence of decision-making processes. So, has the UK’s becoming what Peter Saunders has described as ‘a nation of home owners’ surpassed traditional class effects in terms of people’s sense of self, political attitudes and willingness to work together to protest? 

Class or consumption as a predictor of social action?

Whilst Taylor-Gooby is of the view that “The consumption sector approach…appears to be relatively successful in explaining a range of political phenomena – from local party organization to voting behaviour in national elections” (p.593), Saunders is less clear – at least as to political alignments and motivations of home owners.  On the one hand, he argues that “In Britain and in other countries, home owners frequently act in concert against what they see as a perceived threat to their common interests” (p.256), whilst on the other he states that “To demonstrate that owner-occupiers share common material interests is to say nothing about whether and how these interests are mobilized politically.” (p.229). To cloud the picture still further, he cites Halle’s view[9] that “a class solidarism at work may go hand in hand with a tenure-based conservatism at home…we all occupy a number of different roles which give us different sets of interests to pursue or defend according to the situation…”. (p.256-7) 

Whilst home-ownership - by far the most popular form of housing tenure – is a prime example of individual consumption according the consumption cleavage thesis, the provision of sea defence which, despite recent reforms, continues to be funded principally by the state – is an example of collective consumption, and one that is politically contentious in that it’s benefits are not universally enjoyed. Put crudely, the majority living on the coast will have their individual assets (and means of welfare) protected by a collectively-funded and managed ‘good’ for the foreseeable future, whilst a minority will not.  There is potential, then, in our asking how the ‘interests’ of coastal ‘crunch’ communities might be structured by their consumption position and the effects of this on political mobilization – although not to the exclusion of consideration of traditional occupational class structure.

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[1] Defra, 2009. Consultation on Coastal Change Policy.  London: Defra.

[2] Defra 2009c. Guidance for Community Adaptation Planning and Engagement (CAPE) on the Coast, working paper, Scott Wilson/Defra 2009.

[3] Tilly, C. 1978. From Mobilization to Revolution. New York: Random House.

[4] Della Porta, D. and Diani, M. 2006. Social Movements: An Introduction (second edition). Blackwell.

[5] Touraine, A. 1981. The voice and the eye: An analysis of social movements. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

[6] Taylor-Gooby, P. 1986. Consumption Cleavages and Welfare Politics. Political Studies, XXXIV, 592-606

[7] Saunders, P. 1990. A Nation of Home Owners. London: Unwin Hyman

[8] Dunleavy, P. 1979. The Urban Basis of Political Alignment: Social Class, Domestic Property Ownership, and State Intervention in the Consumption Process. British Journal of Political Science. Volume 9, 409-443.

[9] Halle, D. 1984. America’s Working Man. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Individualising climate risks - an idiot responds

Owner occupation, conservatism and social unrest
Could climate change have come at worse time for UK coastal dwellers?

Many years ago my then girlfriend told me that she found it hard to respect me because I lived in ‘rented accommodation’. I remember at the time thinking what a curiously formal description it was (you can imagine Wallace using it when speaking to Grommit), and what a deadly weight it seemed to have. Looking back, two things strike me. First is my naivety in not seeing this as a signal that the relationship might struggle, and second is the place of housing tenure in considering loss of homes due to the impacts of climate change and associated government policy.

I was reminded of this a couple of weeks ago when the story about the availability of insurance for those in areas with a high risk of flooding was covered by the Guardian[1].  Predictably, the subsequent on-line discussion prompted a range of views, one of which I would suggest is broadly represented by the (verbatim) post:  “Why should I bail out…some idiot who buys a house in a flood risk area?”. Broadening the area under discussion to cover responsibility for adaptation to climate change as it applies to coastal dwellers rather than simply flooding, there is an important point to be considered here.

As things stand, those who have been told that they can expect their homes to be lost to the sea at some point can also expect to bear the full cost. Our Guardian commentator would presumably see this as proper given the individuals’ presumed choice to have bought houses is such locations. But this is to ignore an opportunity to put such questions into a wider and more interesting context with regard to the allocation of risks.

The Anglo-Saxon model

The UK pursues a distinctive approach to housing tenure that favours owner-occupation – characterised by Ronald[2] as the ‘Anglo-Saxon’ model. This has not always been the case, however. He explains that “At the beginning of the 20^th century most British households rented their homes from private landlords and as few as one in ten were owner-occupiers”, and that despite the promise of state support for local authorities in providing new houses for rent in the early 1920s “funds were increasingly shifted…into the provision of owner-occupied homes” (p.22). By 1938 the proportion of owner occupied housing had increased to 32 per cent.

The immediate post-war period and the Labour government’s welfare state, Ronald tells us,   “called for radical changes in housing policy which involved the mass building of rental housing” (p.23). However, this was followed by a reversal in policy which appears to have proceeded more or less uninterrupted ever since. In the 1950s the Conservatives “committed themselves to the ideal of the ‘property owning democracy’” (23) with homeownership establishing itself as the majority tenure by the 1970s. The accompanying property price-boom not only established an “enduring belief that homeownership is one of the best, if not the best, investment accessible to ordinary people” but also saw Labour governments become “more partisan to homeownership policy…”. (23)

Under the Thatcher government, housing privatisation – including the sale of council houses - became a focus of policy accompanied, Ronald observes, by deregulation of the credit market so that by the end of 1990s “the homeownership rate was above 64 per cent” (p.23). Despite an initially cautious approach, Ronald explains that “…New Labour soon began to warm-up to owner-occupation”.  In 2005 plans to “extend homeownership to 75 percent of housing” were announced, with Brown during his tenure as Prime Minister “explicit about his desire to further expand opportunities for homeownership and enhance the features of an asset-based social security system.” (p.24) Thus, we might observe that the individual’s assumption of risk through home ownership can at least in part be historically located and be identified as the product of a politically consensual policy transformation – with this style of tenure operating in lockstep with emerging orthodoxies concerning individualism, welfare and citizenship.

The General Strike 1926 - crossing London Bridge

Kemeny, Ronald tells us, conflates private ownership to the development of “a reserve of housing wealth” that, amongst other things, “offsets pension shortfalls in old age” (p.22); whilst between the world wars the expansion of working class ownership was considered “a potential antidote to both the decline in the private rental sector, on one side, and labour-union agitation, social unrest and demands for the expansion of citizenship rights on the other.” (p.22) In post-war Britain, he namechecks MacMillan, Eden and Thatcher in identifying “an assumption that homeownership would improve civic responsibility and encourage support for conservative political parties…”. (p.29) Buying a house, then, appears to offer value way beyond any individual benefits – an alternative to state welfare provision, and a means of encouraging a certain political disposition in service of a particular type of social order.

Finally, Ronald identifies the current era as “a period of ‘total homeownership policy’ whereby this type of tenure is “almost universally considered the ‘best’ or ‘natural’ way to produce and consume housing” (30). ‘Tenure imperialism’, he calls it.

Where the heart is

Writing some years previously, Gurney[3] explores the ways in which the idea of ‘home’ – being ‘where the heart is’ and ‘where charity begins’, and ‘an Englishman’s castle’, is closely associated with owner-occupation in government policy. He observes of policy documents that: “’Home’ is frequently used to differentiate between the dwellings of householders in owner occupation and in rented accommodation; and dwellings of those in owner occupation are imbued with the warmth and security ‘home’ whilst renters are accorded a more Spartan language to describe their dwelling.” (p.172) In the 1995 Housing White paper, Gurney argues, the idea of ‘home’ exists in a much more meaningful way for those in home ownership than it does for renters, and is expressed through “ideas of love, warmth, comfort, pride, independence and self-respect” (p.173). 

Policy papers also associate home ownership with the uptake and expression of certain values. A 1971 Department of the Environment and Welsh Office command paper sees the government associate home ownership with social advance, whilst in 1981 the Department of the Environment has it that home ownership “ensures the spread of wealth through society…enables parents to accrue wealth for their children and stimulates the attitudes of independence and self-reliance that are the bedrock of a free society” This, proposes Gurney, “carries with it the expectation of home owners being good citizens, good parents and good caretakers.” (176)  Perhaps even more fundamentally, Gurney tells us, the 1971 Department of the Environment and Welsh Office command paper tells us that the desire for home ownership is a “basic and natural desire” (p.178), with the obverse presumably the case for those living under other tenancy arrangements.

I’m not sure how familiar my old girlfriend was with government housing policy papers - not very, is my guess. However, is hard not to wonder at the power of official pronouncement to shape individuals’ opinions and actions through various means.

And I would challenge the individual who responded in such glib fashion to the story in the Guardian to reconsider his (or her) position on the individualisation of risk. I would never argue that those of who own homes on the coast that are at risk from rising sea levels have not exercised choice in so doing. But it is clearly the case that the situation we find ourselves in is significantly the result of forces associated with political preference and the cultivation of certain values, and that accordingly we are threatened as much by socio-economic and political impacts as we are natural ones.

Had climate change as currently understood become an issue in the same way 100 years ago, the consequences for coastal dwellers might have looked very different.  Far fewer would have owned their homes and been exposed to the kinds of risks identified here. Had it happened before the 1970s housing boom then the amount of capital at stake for those who did own their homes would have been smaller relative to earnings, and a state welfare may have been better placed to supported losers. It is also well documented that sea defence in the UK was provided more on the basis of vulnerability in the UK until relatively recently. This is, of course, to simplify.  However…

With best wishes

Chris

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[1] http://www.guardian.co.uk/money/2012/mar/07/flood-hit-homeowners-invest-defence

[2] Ronald, R. 2008. Market-Liberal Homeowner Societies: Questions of Convergance in & around an Anglo-Saxon model? Housing Finance International, March 2008, pp. 21-34.

[3] Gurney, C.  1999. Pride and Prejudice: Discourses of Normalisation in Public and Private Accounts of Home Ownership.  Journal of Housing Studies, Vol. 14. No. 2, 163-183.